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Mobile Warriors and Cosmopolitan Intellectuals: 





For the last two generations, historians have understood the long war between the Dutch 
and the Acehnese in the context of accelerating Dutch imperialism in the archipelago.1 
When the Dutch contemplated attacking Aceh in 1873, their goal was to expand Dutch 
territory and power, and this ambition was sufficient to justify violent conquest. For the 
next twenty-eight years, up until Acehnese resistance was destroyed in 1901, the Dutch 
fought to establish a colonial government in Acehnese territory. While the unsuccessful 
policies to achieve these ends were frequently criticized, especially after the Acehnese 
continued to resist Dutch advances, the wider purpose of expanding territory and people 
under Dutch power was not. The Dutch believed that a successful conquest would lead 
smoothly to a military occupation that made way for a beneficent civil government. Even 
when Acehnese resistance continued unabated, this basic idea died hard. For this reason, 
the Dutch were reluctant counter-insurgents, not believing it was necessary. Eventually the 
Dutch colonial government came to see that they did not understand their opponent’s 
guerrilla mentality, and they did not have the tactics to fight insurgents who blended into 
the countryside. It was not until the Dutch colonial government solved both of these 
problems that an effective counterinsurgency strategy was employed. 
 Historians of twentieth century counterinsurgency doctrine have been particularly good 
at showing its historical development in British and American armies, and how they have 
sought to learn and adapt from previous conflicts to refine these doctrines. Less, though, 
has been written about how these counter-insurgencies came to be embedded in political 
systems.2 More recently, historians of Southeast Asian politics have been effective at 
showing how counter-insurgencies became part of military regimes. I take my cue from 
scholars such as Mary Callahan, who has effectively shown how the military counter-
insurgencies of Burma in the 1940s and 1950s led to the establishment of a military regime 
that treated Burmese citizens as enemies.3 In the Acehnese case, the Dutch colonial 
government had no set of counterinsurgency doctrines to draw upon, based upon 
experiences in the Netherlands East Indies or elsewhere. The war did lead, however, to a 
way of policing colonial society, which incorporated counterinsurgency tactics in every-day 
control of the populace. 
 After 1898, the lessons and techniques of the Dutch counterinsurgency in Aceh were 
incorporated directly into the colonial regime, which allowed for targeted violent 
suppression to be a regular element of civilian rule. It was not until the charismatic and 
ambitious Colonel J.B. van Heutsz teamed up with the orientalist C. Snouck Hurgronje that 
the Dutch colonial government developed an effective counterinsurgency campaign, which 
combined mobile military units with policies designed to isolate the Acehnese leaders 
opposed to the Dutch colonial government. At its core this was a form of colonial rule, 
which combined political insight about the Acehnese with a flexible military arm. Two men 
of very different education, temperament, and politics (and who after their usefulness to 
each other ran out in 1906, strongly disliked each other in later life), not only worked 
together, but managed to invent a counterinsurgency campaign that could be smoothly 
integrated into colonial governance. The final result was not only the defeat of the 
Acehnese resistance, but the creation of a new tool of the colonial government. Mobile 
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military power could be called upon to suppress any opposition to Dutch authority. And 
with both military officials and colonial experts fighting all resistance as if it were a 
counterinsurgency, targeted, violent responses became a routine means of maintaining 
control for the remaining 40 years of Dutch colonial rule. 
 The war began in 1873, at the beginning of a period of imperial conquest, in which a 
collaboration of ambitious colonial officials, private-sector backing and the Dutch 
Parliament sought to expand the Netherlands East Indies to include all the lands of the 
archipelago not already controlled by another European power. Aceh had for more than a 
half-century been off-limits to the Dutch because the 1824 Anglo-Dutch treaty had 
guaranteed Acehnese independence. Once this stipulation was removed in a new treaty in 
1871, claims, many false or exaggerated, quickly surfaced of Acehnese duplicity, 
suggesting they were scheming against the Dutch. The colonial authorities in Batavia, the 
capital of the Dutch colony the Netherlands East Indies, were not hard to convince, and by 
1873 they authorized an invasion force. When that expedition was repelled, a larger 
invasion force was more carefully prepared, which landed in late 1873. By January of 1874 
the Dutch captured the sultan’s palace without firing a shot. Shortly thereafter, the Dutch 
military, under the command of Colonel Pel, began a military administration of all of Aceh, 
on the assumption that with the capture of the sultan’s palace, the Acehnese fighting spirit 
was broken. The Dutch formally incorporated all of Aceh in the Netherlands East Indies, 
and the military began building a garrison in the town around the sultan’s palace, known as 
Kotaraja, but now with the Dutch as the sovereigns.4 In fact, the Acehnese fighters, 
including the Sultan, had simply withdrawn from the town in advance of the Dutch 
expeditionary force, and took to the valleys and mountains, and the agricultural heartland of 
Aceh. For the next few decades, the Acehnese fought a sustained insurgency campaign 
against the Dutch forces. And while the Dutch were able to maintain control of the capital 
city, their response to the resistance was largely ineffective until 1896. 
 Initially the Dutch believed Aceh would be controlled by defeating its sultan, as had 
worked elsewhere in the colony. They clung to this idea tenaciously. In the early 1880s, the 
Dutch colonial government installed a civilian administration in Aceh, made up of officials 
transplanted from Java, to control the countryside.5 Subsequent resistance showed their 
misplaced confidence, and starting in 1884, the peculiar challenge of Aceh was 
acknowledged. By then, the Aceh-insurgency worried Dutch politicians and colonial 
officials; the Dutch empire seemed to be under siege. What followed was a series of 
military strategies meant to secure and bolster colonial rule in the area. The first, began in 
1884, was the creation of a concentrated line around Kotaradja, made up of sixteen 
garrisoned posts linked by phone lines and a steam tramway, which created a kind of Dutch 
Green Zone. Right from the start, the fortified positions were under near constant siege, and 
few Dutch ventured outside the safety of the line.6 Within the fifty square kilometers of the 
militarized zone, a military governor and officials had both civil and military authority. 
After 1884, military officers became responsible for civil administration, judicial rulings, 
and even the crafting of policy – they were a miniature military state and as I will go into 
later, the nursery from which methods of controlling dissident segments of the population 
grew. The Dutch defensive posts, however, were under continuous threat of attack, and 
Acehnese rebels routinely infiltrated the concentrated line to stage attacks against Dutch 
officials. The Dutch quickly began cutting deals with Acehnese elites in an effort to 
maintain peace. This included Teukoe Oemar, an important Acehnese chieftain paid and 
outfitted by the Dutch colonial government, and someone the Dutch expected would be 
able to rule all of Aceh in their name. 
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 As the Acehnese problem became a thorn in the side of the Dutch empire, it became the 
responsibility of the governor general in Buitenzorg to solve it. The mini-military state was 
forced to accept help from other colonial officials. With the perceived stakes very high, the 
empire gathered new ideas about solving the Acehnese problem. This pressure also allowed 
young officials, with new ideas about cracking the Acehnese nut, to influence policy. At the 
end of the 1880s, Van Heutsz, doing his third tour in Aceh, became a trusted advisor to the 
military governor of Aceh, Van Teijn, where he created new units which launched 
lightening strikes on the interior. After 1890, these anti-guerrilla units were able to chase 
down rebels far outside the concentrated line.7 And in 1891, Governor General Pijnacker 
Hordijk sent the orientalist Snouck Hurgronje to Aceh, to conduct an extensive 
investigation of Acehnese society. Snouck Hurgronje was already a well-known expert 
about Islam, who had published a book about Mecca based on an extended visit in the city 
closed to non-Muslims, and had since 1889 been part of the colonial administration. His 
report of May 1892 established him not just as an expert about Aceh, but as a principal 
advisor on political and military policies to defeat the insurgency.8 
 In the twentieth century in the Netherlands, the two men became legends, largely 
because of their leadership in the counterinsurgency. The Van Heutsz myth is older. After 
1901, Van Heutsz emerged as the conqueror of Aceh, and his career was capped by four 
years as the governor general of the Netherlands East Indies. After his death in 1924, he 
was remembered by many colonial officials as the man who had done most to keep the 
empire together, and who had provided a moral compass for the Dutch as colonizers. In 
1935, the Van Heutsz monument was erected in Amsterdam, and through the 1940s, 
invoking his memory continued to serve as a rallying cry for Dutch imperial power.9 The 
history of the Van Heutsz myth is largely beyond the scope of this paper, but at its core it is 
about his role in pacifying Aceh. A number of counter-myths have arisen; in Jakarta in 
1950, the Van Heutsz monument was torn down, and the street it was on renamed after 
Teukoe Oemar, the Acehnese chieftain who turned against his Dutch paymasters. Since the 
fall of their empire in 1949, another counter-myth to Van Heutsz’s memory has centered 
upon Snouck Hurgronje, and his credit in pacifying the Acehnese.10 All of these myths, 
however, occlude the real importance of their cooperation. This is not the story of just a 
great military tactician, an inspiring leader, a fearless commanding officer – Van Heutsz – 
or a brilliant, insightful, and penetrating analyst of Acehnese strengths and weakness – 
Snouck Hurgronje. The personal bond between soldier and intellectual was subsequently 
institutionalized, and became the root of the colony’s ability to suppress, violently if 
necessary, any colonial unrest. 
 The 1892 report about society, culture and politics in Aceh was the basis of Snouck’s 
authority in government circles. The ethnographic and political description of the report 
was published in book-form shortly thereafter.11 The policy conclusions, in which Snouck 
sketched a broad approach to establishing territorial hegemony in Aceh, were kept secret, 
but they were reproduced in a printed edition of his papers in 1957. Snouck’s secret report 
stressed that in Islamic societies such as Aceh, religious faith and political culture were 
naturally distinct. According to Snouck, Acehnese peasants followed their local territorial 
rulers, the uleebelang, whose traditions were governed by adat (local traditions). Acehnese 
peasants had traditionally deferred to the uleebelang, but recently had begun following the 
ulama, who professed a new form of political, Islamic leadership. For Snouck, this 
conclusion suggested a political intervention which went far beyond circumventing the 
sultanate, which had little authority. He argued that the ulama (as well as certain adventurer 
uleebelang not tied hereditarily to the land) would need to be eliminated by venturing 
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beyond the concentrated line. The Dutch administration would then need to rebuild 
Acehnese trust in the Dutch, by sponsoring agricultural initiatives and encouraging trade. 
He also suggested that the Dutch civil and military officials be aided by experts who could 
help the administration to craft policies that would allow subtlety in distinguishing between 
potential Acehnese allies and arch enemies. His own future role goes unmentioned, but 
these conclusions would seem to necessitate his inclusion in the future crafting of 
administrative policies.12 Under Governor General Pijnacker Hordijk this did not happen, 
especially since his military governor in Aceh, Major-General C. Deijkerhoff, believed 
Snouck had exaggerated the power of the ulamas.13  
 The new Governor General C.H.A. van der Wijck who took over in 1893, however, 
began to regularly consult Snouck, even though Deijkerhoff had some spectacular success 
in 1894 after an army under the command of Dutch ally Teukoe Oemar captured much of 
the highlands East and West of the Acehnese valley. The new governor general was not 
satisfied with the subdued military presence pursued by Deijkerhoff, now promoted to 
general, as Van der Wijck’s decision to invade Lombok in 1894 shows. He began to use 
Snouck as a sounding board, asking his advice about Aceh policy.14 Moreover, Snouck felt 
sufficiently secure that in a lengthy letter to the governor general in 1896, he not only 
defended his own positions, often by citing his book about Aceh, but sternly criticized 
General Deijkerhoff.15 And even though the letter was written just prior to Teukoe Oemar’s 
treason, in which the Acehnese chieftain turned his Dutch weapons against his former 
Dutch allies, it arrived on Van der Wijck’s desk just as the betrayal became known. Van der 
Wijck sacked Deijkerhoff, and prepared a large military expedition against the Dutch 
empire’s chief villain, and Snouck was positioned to make his mark on colonial rule. 
 Most histories of Snouck’s involvement in Aceh stress the importance of his theories 
about Islam in Acehnese society and politics. This should give us pause. Research by the 
anthropologist James Siegel on the place of Islam in modern Acehnese society has argued 
convincingly that the uleebelang were not hereditary territorial leaders, a point of departure 
from Snouck, but successful traders who controlled local markets as well as the trade in and 
out of Aceh. Moreover, this economic position had been bolstered by political authority 
derived from official appointments from the sultan. Moreover, the ulama were by the late 
19th century integrated into the Acehnese villages, often much more closely than the 
uleebelang.16 And the conflict that Snouck and other colonial experts believed separated 
adat and Islamic law, was a colonial fantasy.17 The success of the counterinsurgency cannot 
be due to a doctrine built on such errors. 
 Nonetheless, Snouck played a key role in the Acehnese counterinsurgency. He was, do 
not misunderstand, very well informed about Aceh, and was insightful about Acehnese 
society and politics, even if he misunderstood the place of Islam. But having established 
himself as an expert on Islam and Aceh, and having won the confidence of the governor 
general, he helped craft the counterinsurgency policies. And this had nothing to do with 
doctrine or social-theory. In letters between Snouck and Van der Wijck, they discussed 
military appointments, counterinsurgency tactics, and military troop deployments.18 
Snouck, in particular, pushed for Van Heutsz to be given greater responsibilities; in 1892, 
when Van Heutsz was in Batavia at the same time as Snouck, the two had discussed the 
Aceh-problem extensively, and both were opposed to the concentrated line. A series of 
articles and memos written by Van Heutsz in 1892 and 1893 had brought Van Heutsz to the 
attention of the Governor General. Snouck often found time to remind Van der Wijck that 
Van Heutsz was the man of the future, who would break the Gordian knot in Aceh.19 
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 In mid-1896, Van der Wijck replaced Deijkerhoff with J.A. Vetter, the so-called butcher 
of Lombok, and gave him wide latitude to pursue his own military options.20 Vetter created 
two large units of the 1,000 soldiers each, most of whom had fought for him in Lombok. 
Starting in 1896, these units scoured the Acehnese countryside, destroying villages in their 
entirety. These scorched-earth expeditions continued through 1897, and although they were 
successful in chasing Teukoe Oemar’s allies, they did not lessen Acehnese resistance.  
 In 1898, Van der Wijck appointed Van Heutsz as Governor of Aceh. In close 
consultation with Snouck, who joined Van Heutsz in Aceh, they then developed a plan to 
permanently pacify Aceh through political and military means.21 This led to the first large-
scale forays under Van Heutsz’s command, which in mid-1898 led to an expedition of 
7,500 men to Pedir, the heart of resistance in the mountains of the Acehnese northeastern 
coast. In the aftermath of the Pedir expedition, Van Heutsz and Snouck put in practice a 
counter-guerrilla warfare, in which small, mobile units, largely comprised of native soldiers 
from Ambon and Java, attacked insurgents. By the fall of 1898, these units had captured a 
number of high-level rebels, although at that time Teukoe Oemar escaped them. Snouck 
continued to be involved in developing an administrative framework, and wrote a standard 
contract for those uleebelangs cooperating with the Dutch, the “Short Declaration,” in 
which local chiefs signed away sovereignty to the Dutch colonial government, while at the 
same time it gave them official recognition as local political authorities. Snouck’s “Short 
Declaration” was first used in Aceh in late 1898.22 Snouck’s own account of the Pedir 
expedition appeared in an Indies newspaper later in 1898, in which he boasted of the 
policies’ success.23 The fighting continued through 1901; Teukoe Oemar was killed in 
1899, and thereafter the insurgency was on the defensive. The Dutch now staffed a viable 
civil administration, in which Dutch bureaucrats worked closely with compliant uleebelang. 
 I want to finish with three conclusions about the long-term repercussions of the 
Acehnese counterinsurgency campaign after 1896. First, it highlights the importance of 
mobile fighting units, which could inflict violence and damage well beyond the safety of 
cities and garrisons. But this is hardly sufficient, as it was not until Van Heutsz took 
command of these forces that they were effective. Second, the campaign demonstrates that 
mobile forces need more than good intelligence about the location of their enemies. They 
need an overall framework for understanding who, amongst the insurgent population might 
support them, and who will not. Prior to Snouck Hurgronje’s involvement in the fight, the 
counterinsurgency operations concentrated on defeating as many of the enemy as possible, 
without contemplating which native elites would make good future governing partners. And 
third, this counterinsurgency operation required a close working relationship between 
intellectuals, military officers, and governing bureaucrats. The counter-guerrilla warfare 
only worked after old barriers came down, and new forms of collaboration grew between 
colonial officials whose jobs had previously not been understood as overlapping.  
 This new relationship ushered in the height of Dutch colonialism, in which the Dutch 
governing authorities used mobile violence as an effective tool against armed opposition. 
Native informants, cultural experts, policemen and military officers worked closely 
together to maintain the peace or order of the Netherlands East Indies. The Dutch did not 
fight an insurgency campaign for the next four decades, because they did not need to. In 
Bali in 1906, and after Van Heutsz had become Governor General, a major invasion force 
took south Bali by storm, and the war ended with a battle between the large Dutch force 
and the king of Bali and his family.24 Insurgencies, as well as peasant-revolts, political 
riots, and insurrections, were stamped out before they got started, because of the close 
collaboration between a wide range of colonial officials, both Dutch and natives, who were 
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able to rapidly summon a military force to target the unrest. This then is the legacy of the 
Acehnese counterinsurgency: the establishment of a colonial government able to summon 
violent response purposeful to any threat. And this arrangement does not hinge on a 
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